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Labor Policy in the Great Recession 
ROBERT J. FLANAGAN* 
All political administrations confront two great labor market concerns—the 
general level of employment and the distribution of wages, employment, and other 
labor market outcomes. Although both of these concerns faced the Obama 
administration, which inherited both a serious recession and an upward trend in 
earnings inequality, the country’s severe employment losses clearly presented the 
more urgent problem. This Article considers the policy responses and the scope for 
labor market regulation in addressing these challenges. 
All political administrations also confront two constraints in the pursuit of their 
labor market goals. Responsible labor market policy design must recognize 
tradeoffs—inherent conflicts with other policy objectives. Efforts to raise 
employment eventually encounter very real risks of inflation, expansionary fiscal 
policies increase federal budget deficits, and efforts to reduce inequalities may 
mute incentives. The art of policymaking involves judging how far key objectives 
can be pursued before the tradeoffs become salient. 
The political system imposes the second constraint. Raising the level of 
employment is largely an issue for macroeconomic policy on which there are 
distinct limits on a president’s power. Employment losses during a recession may 
be reversed by appropriate monetary and fiscal policies, but U.S. presidents do not 
get to design and implement monetary policy. The Federal Reserve Board (FRB), 
which formulates and implements U.S. monetary policy, remains formally 
independent of the executive branch of government. Its members serve long, 
staggered terms that are independent of national political cycles. The FRB may 
choose monetary policies that complement the nation’s fiscal policies, but it is not 
required to do so and has not always chosen to do so. (The European Central Bank 
enjoys similar independence as do central banks in a growing number of countries.) 
A president can initiate fiscal policies by proposing changes in expenditures and/or 
the tax code, but all such proposals may be altered significantly before they acquire 
congressional approval. The same may be said of policies and regulations aimed at 
altering the pay distribution. Under the extensive sharing of powers in U.S. political 
system, no president has the unilateral power to “bail out” workers or to alter the 
pay distribution. 
Part I of this Article addresses efforts to attain full employment by countering 
the decline in aggregate demand for the nation’s production. This is mainly 
macroeconomic terrain with little useful role for traditional labor market regulation. 
In fact, there is evidence (discussed in Part II of this Article) that extensively 
regulated labor markets produce inferior macroeconomic outcomes. There is a 
modest complementary role for some varieties of active labor market policy, 
however. The second Part also addresses the distribution of labor market outcomes. 
In a fully employed economy, this topic raises mainly microeconomic issues. In 
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one way or another, labor market regulations seek to alter the distribution of 
outcomes, but they are frequently undermined by unintended consequences. Since 
the United States has less labor market regulation than most other countries,1 the 
experience of foreign countries provides much of the available evidence on the 
impact of labor market regulations. The fact that the Obama administration has not 
pursued an active program of labor market regulation is consistent with both the 
priority of restoring full employment and the fact that labor regulations may not be 
the best policy approach to altering the income distribution. 
I. ATTAINING FULL EMPLOYMENT 
By any objective standard of international evidence, the working conditions and 
labor rights of U.S. workers are among the best in the world. American workers 
enjoy comparatively high pay levels and low industrial accident rates, although 
relatively high annual hours of work. The United States also offers superior labor 
rights—stronger civil liberties, less child and forced labor, and less discrimination 
than most other nations.2 All of these working conditions and labor rights are 
strongly correlated with economic growth: A significant proportion of intercountry 
differences in labor conditions reflect different stages of economic development 
and, more importantly for the United States and other industrialized countries, labor 
conditions vary over time with variations in national output (gross domestic 
product or GDP).3 Even superior labor conditions are threatened by cyclical 
variations in demand, and few threats have been as strong as the “Great Recession” 
that began in 2007.  
That recession dominated all other labor market issues for the first years of the 
Obama administration as the overall national unemployment rate more than 
doubled, increasing by 4.7 percentage points between 2007 and 2009.4 In contrast, 
the average increase in the unemployment rate among Organization for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries was 2.5 percentage points.5 
During this period, the most industrialized countries experienced unemployment 
rate increases that were less than half the U.S. increase.6 One must look to Iceland, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Danielle Venn, Legislation, Collective Bargaining and Enforcement: Updating the 
OECD Employment Protection Indicators 8 (OECD Soc., Emp’t & Migration Working 
Papers, Paper No. 89, 2009), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/ 
download/fulltext/5ksf7m6glc40.pdf?expires=1317397354&id=id&accname=guest&checks
um=E9FFDB0453A6B53849FA6F9FC9F61280; see also Juan C. Botero, Simeon Djankov, 
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Regulation of Labor, 
119 Q. J. ECON. 1339, 1363 tbl.3 (2004). 
 2. See ROBERT J. FLANAGAN, GLOBALIZATION AND LABOR CONDITIONS 9–34 (2006) 
(discussing labor conditions around the world). 
 3. Id. at 35–54. 
 4. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK: MOVING 
BEYOND THE JOBS CRISIS 270 tbl.A (2010) [hereinafter 2010 OECD EMPLOYMENT 
OUTLOOK], available at http://www.tuac.org/en/public/e-docs/00/00/07/4E/document_ 
doc.phtml. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id.  
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Ireland, and Spain to find countries where unemployment rates increased notably 
more than in the United States.7  
The rise in the U.S. unemployment rate also exceeded historical experience. For 
decades, a relationship known as Okun’s Law provided reliable predictions of how 
unemployment varies with GDP. If the traditional relationship had held throughout 
the Great Recession, the rise in the unemployment rate would have been half what 
the nation experienced. Unusually rapid productivity gains in 2009 appear to 
explain the breakdown in the historical relationship.8 The productivity surge 
enabled employers to reduce employment levels even after GDP began to recover. 
The Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER)—a committee of macroeconomists that dates the peaks and 
troughs of U.S. business cycles—has noted that the decline in national output that 
began in December 2007 (over a year before the Obama administration took office) 
reached its low point in June 2009.9 Yet, payroll employment continued to decline 
until December 2009.10 The persistence of employment declines after output begins 
to recover is not unusual. The NBER committee noted that “in 2001-03, the trough 
in payroll employment occurred 21 months after the NBER trough date.”11 Without 
the productivity surge, the U.S. unemployment growth would have been much 
closer to the European experience. It is not yet clear why the productivity surge 
experienced in the United States did not emerge in other countries. 
On the surface, the appropriate policy response was well defined. Recessions 
occur when actual GDP falls short of potential GDP—the output that could be 
produced in a fully employed economy. To reduce unemployment and restore full 
employment, aggregate demand must be increased sufficiently to eliminate the gap 
between actual and potential GDP. The textbook policy responses are for central 
banks to reduce interest rates to encourage spending on investment and 
consumption items that must be financed and for the executive and legislative 
branches to approve increased government spending and/or reduced taxes to 
encourage more private spending. Dollar for dollar, direct government spending 
will provide the more powerful fiscal stimulus, because some of the increased 
disposable income provided by tax cuts will be saved.12  
The current recession was met with an appropriate mix of monetary and fiscal 
policies. The Federal Reserve reduced short-term interest rates to approximately 
zero and adopted several innovative strategies to increase the money supply. With 
the central bank unable to reduce interest rates below zero, further stimulus had to 
come from fiscal policy. Eventually, a divided Congress approved a package of 
federal spending projects known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. MARY DALY & BART HOBIJN, FED. RES. BANK OF S.F., FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER: 
OKUN’S LAW AND THE UNEMPLOYMENT SURPRISE OF 2009 (2010), available at 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2010/el2010-07.html. 
 9. NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee Announces Trough Date, NAT’L BUREAU 
OF ECON. RES. (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. ANDREW B. ABEL, BEN S. BERNANKE & DEAN CROUSHORE, MACROECONOMICS 416–
19 (6th ed. 2008). 
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(ARRA).13 Although debates continue about both the size and composition of the 
package, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office concluded that expenditures 
provided by the ARRA raised employment between 1.3 and 3.3 million people and 
reduced the national unemployment rate in 2010 by between 0.7 and 1.8 percentage 
points.14 The economic recovery that began in July 2009 slowed dramatically by 
mid-2010, however. Yet, two concerns inhibited efforts to provide more fiscal 
stimulus—the impact of further economic expansion on inflation and on 
government deficits and debt.  
II. UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION 
Historically, concerns about increasing inflationary pressures dominated 
thinking about how far employment could be expanded. As output increases and 
new hiring diminishes the pool of the unemployed, employers eventually raise pay 
to attract workers, and the increased costs are transmitted into prices. As prices 
increase, expectations of future price increases are built into pay demands and the 
costs of other inputs. Ideally, a country reduces unemployment to the rate where 
those pressures just begin to build. That is, the full employment goal is effectively 
defined in terms of inflation. The full-employment unemployment rate—known by 
the technically accurate but verbally awkward term “nonaccelerating inflation rate 
of unemployment” (NAIRU)—is not zero. Even in a fully employed economy, the 
expansion and contraction of individual firms along with job search by those 
entering the labor force produces frictional unemployment. It takes time to match 
workers with appropriate jobs. While the NAIRU is not necessarily constant over 
time, estimates of the current U.S. NAIRU fall in the range of 4.5–5%—too far 
below the actual unemployment rates of 9.6–9.8% in the second half of 2010 to 
accept inflation risk as a credible objection to further monetary and fiscal 
stimulus.15 
Nevertheless, if the target unemployment rate ultimately constrains an 
employment expansion, what policies might lower the target rate? Almost sixty 
years ago, economists in the Swedish labor unions proposed, and their government 
ultimately accepted, a variety of “active labor market policies” intended to move 
workers from sectors of weak demand to sectors with vacant jobs.16 The proposal 
was part of an effort to implement a “solidaristic wage policy” that would provide 
equal pay for equal work.17 Faced with concerns that the policy would suppress 
market incentives for workers to move from areas of low labor demand to areas of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115 (2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_ 
cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ005.pdf. 
 14. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATED IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND 
REINVESTMENT ACT ON EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC OUTPUT FROM APRIL 2010 THROUGH 
JUNE 2010, at 3 tbl.1 (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/117xx/doc11706/08-
24-ARRA.pdf. 
 15. ABEL ET AL., supra note 12, at 459. 
 16. Robert J. Flanagan, Efficiency and Equality in Swedish Labor Markets, in THE 
SWEDISH ECONOMY 125, 154 (Barry P. Bosworth & Alice M. Rivlin eds., 1987). 
 17. Id. at 131.  
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high demand, the union economists argued that such reallocations of labor could be 
achieved far more effectively by government policies to train workers and 
subsidize their mobility between regions.18 By shortening the duration of time 
between jobs, it was argued, the target unemployment rate—the lowest rate that 
could be achieved with insignificant inflation—could be reduced.19 
In short, active labor market programs (ALMPs) could complement monetary 
and fiscal expansions. After all, there must be sufficient demand in the first place to 
provide employment opportunities for retrained workers. Retraining could qualify 
workers for better opportunities but by itself could not create those opportunities. 
Within a few years these programs became quite the policy rage as country after 
country was attracted to the possibility of lowering the NAIRU.20 The United States 
introduced its first programs in the early 1960s, albeit on a much smaller scale than 
Sweden, and many other industrialized nations followed Sweden’s lead over the 
next decade.21 Gradually, the variety of programs increased from classroom and on-
the-job training to public service employment programs, wage subsidies for hiring 
low-skill workers, and job search assistance programs. By 2007, expenditures on 
such programs22 represented 1.12% of GDP in Sweden, but only 0.131% in the 
United States. (The average for OECD nations was 0.57%.)23 
Over the decades, such active labor market programs have produced mixed 
results. A recent “meta-study” synthesized the findings of some ninety-seven 
ALMP evaluations providing 199 separate estimates of ALMP impacts in twenty-
six mainly European and North American countries.24 The synthesis was able to 
provide assessments of program impacts one year, two years, and three years after 
program completion. Job search assistance programs were most likely to generate 
positive outcomes for program participants, presumably by reducing the length of 
their unemployment and possibly by identifying jobs offering superior earning 
opportunities. Training programs were unlikely to produce gains immediately after 
program completion, but significant positive outcomes often emerged after two to 
three years.25 Public service employment programs were least likely to produce 
positive outcomes for participants.26  
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. Id. at 133. 
 19. See Rudolf Meidner, The Goals of Labour Market Policy, in ON INCOMES POLICY: 
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS FROM A CONFERENCE IN HONOUR OF ERIK LUNDBERG 189, 189 
(Industrial Council for Social and Economic Studies ed., 1969) (“[I]t would be possible to 
close an inflationary gap with the help of recruitment of new labour.”). 
 20. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 73–85 
(1992), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/23/2485416.pdf. 
 21. Id. at 73. 
 22. Expenditures for training, employment incentives such as wage subsidies, supported 
employment, direct job creation, and startup incentives, and the public employment service. 
 23. 2010 OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK, supra note 4, 305 tbl.K. 
 24. David Card, Jochen Kluve & Andrea Weber, Active Labor Market Policy 
Evaluations: A Meta-Analysis 1–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
16173, 2010). 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id.  
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The effectiveness of ALMPs has not changed much over time. Looking back at 
the past twenty years, Card, Kluve, and Weber conclude that “there is no tendency 
for the most recent programs to exhibit better or worse outcomes than programs 
from the late 1980s.”27 A separate analysis of unemployment in OECD countries 
concludes that public investments in ALMP reduce a country’s NAIRU but 
provides no information on which types of programs are relatively effective.28 The 
Obama administration has announced no ALMP initiatives to date. Even if there 
were strong evidence that such policies shifted the NAIRU, they have no practical 
role to play until macroeconomic policies reduce unemployment to a level that 
raises the demand for workers and the threat of inflation.  
III. GOVERNMENT DEFICITS 
Political resistance to further fiscal stimulus also reflects concerns about the 
impact of fiscal policies on the federal government budget balance. Countercyclical 
fiscal policy requires deficit financing in recessions as a national government seeks 
to stimulate demand by spending more money itself or providing taxpayers with 
more spendable income by reducing their taxes. (Conversely, when demand is 
strong, a government budget surplus can restrain inflationary pressures.) Without 
deficit financing, there is no fiscal stimulus. Objecting to deficit spending in a 
period in which monetary policy has been carried as far as it can go is effectively a 
recipe for inaction in the face of the highest unemployment rates incurred in the 
United States since the Great Depression.  
But do policies that provide more employment for today’s workers burden 
future generations of worker-taxpayers who must repay the government’s debts? 
The answer to this question depends on how the money is used—whether 
government stimulus spending is mainly for investment or consumption. Public 
(and private) investment may provide the means for future repayment by increasing 
future national output and income sufficiently to leave future generations better off 
even after repaying the debt. In contrast, spending for current consumption 
purposes does not provide the means for future repayment, since it does not 
contribute to the growth of future output. Over the past thirty years, U.S. 
government deficits have financed rather more consumption than investment 
spending.29 Prospectively, the proposals by the Obama administration for additional 
stimulus in the form of investment in public infrastructure are more likely to 
contribute to economic growth.  
Before the current era of globalization, economics textbooks often noted that to 
a large extent the government debt was “owed to ourselves.”30 That is, the future 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. Id. at 16. 
 28. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK: 
BOOSTING JOBS AND INCOMES 208–09, 216–17 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 OECD 
EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK], available at http://www.oecd.org/document/0/0,3746, 
en_2649_33927_40774656_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 29. CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, MEMOS TO THE PRESIDENT: A GUIDE THROUGH 
MACROECONOMICS FOR THE BUSY POLICYMAKER 247–48 (1992). 
 30. See GEORGE LELAND BACH, ROBERT FLANAGAN, JAMES HOWELL, FERDINAND LEVY 
& ANTHONY LIMA, ECONOMICS: ANALYSIS, DECISION MAKING, AND POLICY 236 (11th ed. 
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taxes paid by Americans to retire the government debt were received by other 
Americans who held that debt. Retiring the debt involved an internal redistribution 
of income, but not a burden on the country as a whole. Nowadays, foreign countries 
hold vast amounts of government debt.31 Indeed, with the country’s notoriously low 
private savings rate and regular government deficits (negative government savings), 
U.S. private investment would have been much lower over the past quarter century 
if foreign countries had been less willing to lend to us.32 To a significant extent, we 
no longer “owe it to ourselves.” Whether the eventual need to repay foreigners to 
retire some government debt constitutes a burden once again depends on what the 
debt finances. Sufficiently productive investments can in principle yield returns 
large enough to provide domestic gains after repaying foreign investors, but there is 
no guarantee that the political process will produce such public investments.  
Concerns with government deficits and the accumulated public debt periodically 
produce proposals to amend the U.S. Constitution to require that federal 
government budgets balance projected revenues and expenditures annually, except 
in times of war or other national emergency (as determined by vote of a 
congressional supermajority).33 Such proposals lie outside the realm of labor 
market regulation, but if enacted could have a huge impact on the employment of 
the nation’s workers. A balanced budget requirement would eliminate the use of 
fiscal policy to stabilize the economy unless a congressional supermajority defined 
a recession as a national emergency. In the current recession, with the tools of 
monetary policy more or less exhausted, taking a fiscal policy response off the 
table would be a recipe for a much longer and deeper recession. Nor is it necessary 
to abandon fiscal policy tools. There are other approaches to limiting the growth of 
government debt that would preserve fiscal policy as a countercyclical weapon.34 
IV. TAKING STOCK 
The goal of attaining full employment in the current recession is dominantly a 
task for macroeconomic policy. The current administration has initiated appropriate 
fiscal policies, although there is room for debate about whether they should have 
been stronger or composed differently. Both of these qualifications have more to do 
with congressional than executive branch behavior. There are active labor-market 
policies that might eventually lower a nation’s NAIRU, but these involve subsidies 
for acquiring and deploying human capital rather than new regulations. Indeed, 
evidence presented in the next Part indicates that certain varieties of deregulation in 
labor markets could lower the NAIRU further. Finally, proposals to require federal 
budget balance irrespective of macroeconomic conditions threaten much greater 
sacrifices of output, employment, and income during recessions. 
                                                                                                                 
1987). 
 31. See Martin S. Feldstein, Preventing a National Debt Explosion (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16451, 2010). 
 32. See SCHULTZE, supra note 29, at 247–54. 
 33. For a political history of balanced budget proposals, see Kathy Gill, Balanced 
Budget Amendment: Timeline, ABOUT.COM http://uspolitics.about.com/od/thefederalbudget/ 
a/balanced_budget.htm. 
 34. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 
(2010); Feldstein, supra note 31. 
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In the future, legal regulation of other markets may reduce the odds of a repeat 
experience. In the wake of the Great Recession, for example, there has been 
widespread agreement that regulation of some aspects of financial markets would 
lower the risk of following a similar path to recession in the future. In July 2010, 
Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act,35 establishing new regulations for the financial sector. But administrations 
rarely receive credit for heading off future problems. As this Article is written, 
voters seem far more concerned with the sluggish pace of recovery from the 
recession than the reduced odds of a repeat occurrence.  
V. LABOR MARKET REGULATION AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
No country has been willing to permit market forces to be the sole arbiter of 
national employment conditions. Yet, the extent and substance of labor regulation 
vary widely. By all available measures, the United States has less labor market 
regulation than most other countries. The most comprehensive study of 
comparative labor regulation assesses the legal protection of a standard worker or 
employer in eighty-five countries as of 1997.36 The project recorded the extent of 
legal protection for different aspects of the employment relationship and assessed 
the costs of certain personnel actions, such as increasing work hours or dismissing 
workers. For each country, the study produced an overall index of the degree of 
labor protection, and sub-indices of four specific areas of protection—employment 
laws (wage and hour regulation, dismissal procedures, etc.), collective relations 
laws (union formation, collective bargaining, and labor disputes), social security 
laws (eligibility and benefits for various types of social insurance), and civil rights 
laws. 
Based on these indices, the United States ranks seventy-sixth out of the eighty-
five nations in the strength of its employment and collective relations regulations.37 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ203.pdf. 
 36. Botero et al., supra note 1. Quoting from the study: 
The standardized male worker has the following characteristics: (i) he is a 
nonexecutive full-time employee who has been working in the same firm for 
twenty years; (ii) his salary plus benefits equal the country’s GNP per worker 
during the entire period of employment; (iii) he has a nonworking wife and two 
children, and the family has always resided in the country’s most populous city; 
(iv) he is a lawful citizen who belongs to the same race and religion as the 
majority of the country’s population; (v) he is not a member of the labor union 
(unless membership is mandatory); and (vi) he retires at the age defined by the 
country’s laws. We also assume a “standardized” employer with the following 
characteristics: (i) it is a manufacturing company wholly owned by nationals; 
(ii) its legal domicile and its main place of business is the country’s most 
populous city; (iii) it has 250 workers; and (iv) it abides by every law and 
regulation, but does not grant workers more prerogatives than are legally 
mandated.  
Id. at 1353 n.6. 
 37. See id. at 1362–63. 
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It ranks eighty-first in the level of its dismissal costs, although it is not clear how 
effectively the study evaluated the exceptions to at-will employment fashioned by 
U.S. state courts in recent decades.38 In comparative perspective, the United States 
ranked highest in the areas of civil rights and social insurance (forty-first and fifty-
first out of eighty-five, respectively).39 (These were the only areas of employment 
regulation in which the United States ranked above the mean for the international 
sample.)  
VI. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY DIVERSITY 
What accounts for this diverse regulatory experience, and what difference does 
it make for economic policy? A country’s legal traditions may influence the extent 
of its employment regulation. Common law systems, associated with England and 
its former colonies, take a comparatively skeptical stance toward the role of the 
state and rely more on judicial discretion than civil codes. Civil law systems that 
emerged in France, Germany, and Scandinavia rely heavily on substantive and 
procedural codes and limit judicial discretion. On average, countries with a civil 
law tradition produce more extensive labor (and other) regulation.40 Yet, the 
common law tradition in the United States does not fully explain its modest level of 
labor regulation. Even among industrialized, common law countries the U.S. 
ranking is comparatively low.  
The varied rationales for labor regulation account for additional international 
diversity in labor regulation. Much U.S. labor legislation proceeds from a rarely 
examined assertion that employers always bring superior bargaining power to the 
employment relationship. The assertion is not a convincing basis for regulatory 
policy. Employers may announce employment conditions on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis, but if workers leave it, choosing instead to work for another employer, the 
announcement amounts to little practical economic power. Bargaining power in 
fact rests on the degree of choice available to employers and workers respectively. 
The working conditions offered by any employer are constrained by the ability of 
employees or job applicants to take other jobs offering superior conditions. 
Similarly, the conditions demanded by any worker are constrained by the 
employment conditions that other workers are willing to accept. Unequal 
bargaining power emerges only when choice is circumscribed on either side of the 
market.  
A September 2010 antitrust settlement between the Department of Justice and 
six high-tech firms in Silicon Valley illustrates how worker choice (bargaining 
power) that has been circumscribed can be reestablished by appropriate legal 
action.41 Beginning in 2005, six large Silicon Valley firms established a series of 
bilateral agreements in which each firm agreed not to “cold call” (initiate recruiting 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. Data accessed at http://iicg.som.yale.edu/. 
 39. See Botero et al., supra note 1, at 1362–63. 
 40. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic 
Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008). 
 41. Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-
01629 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2010). 
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contacts with) employees of other companies.42 By reducing the effective choice of 
employers available to workers, such agreements converted a competitive labor 
market into a monopsonistic market, suppressing pay and other conditions of work. 
In the settlement, the offending firms agreed to eliminate this practice.43 The 
attractive approach of the Obama Department of Justice was to eliminate the source 
of unequal bargaining power rather than to conjecture about how the regulation of 
employment conditions might counter it. 
Other regulations seek to provide workplace public goods, like job safety.44 A 
safe workplace benefits all employees simultaneously, but individual workers, who 
each receive only a fraction of the benefits from greater safety, are unlikely to 
bargain hard for it. Many will free ride on the efforts of others. Job safety 
regulation may solve this collective choice problem. Still other regulations, such as 
unemployment insurance, workers compensation, and retirement benefits, insure 
workers against employment risks. Variations in labor regulation among countries 
reflect different national assessments of the importance of these factors. 
VII. LABOR REGULATION AND MACROECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
Two major international studies of the relationship between labor market 
regulations and macroeconomic outcomes indicate that the United States may 
benefit from its comparatively modest regulation. A cross-country regression 
analysis of the 1997 data from eighty-five countries indicates that stronger 
employment regulations are associated with higher unemployment rates 
(particularly among younger workers), lower male labor force participation rates, 
and relatively high employment in unofficial (unregulated) sectors of the 
economy.45  
In a separate study, the OECD also finds that most of its member countries go 
further than the United States with labor market regulation.46 For example, their 
statutory minimum wages are a higher fraction of the median wage, their 
unemployment benefit payments replace a larger fraction of past wages, and their 
employment protection laws (restrictions on separations) are more stringent.47 A 
regression analysis of data from member countries for 1982 through 2003 found 
that greater labor and product market regulation tends to raise the noncyclical 
unemployment rate (that is, the NAIRU). In fact, the OECD study concluded that 
“changes in policies and institutions appear to explain almost two-thirds of non-
cyclical unemployment changes over the past two decades.”48 
How can regulation worsen a country’s unemployment experience? Consider the 
OECD’s finding that a relatively high unemployment insurance replacement rate is 
associated with higher unemployment. A long line of labor market research 
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recognized by the 2010 Nobel Prize in economics has explored links between job 
search incentives and unemployment. A fundamental prediction of this research is 
that lowering the cost of job search will lengthen the search (unemployment).49 The 
comparatively generous European approach to supporting the unemployed also 
reduces the cost of job search and hence reduces the pressure to find and accept a 
job until unemployment benefits are near exhaustion. The higher level of 
unemployment that results from more generous benefits, while modest in 
comparison to the effects of the collapse of national output, prompted many 
Republican members of Congress to oppose the Obama administration’s ultimately 
successful efforts to extend unemployment benefits during the depths of the Great 
Recession. The tension between supporting the unemployed and reducing 
incentives to accept work reflects a failure to recognize that each economic policy 
instrument can target only one objective. Higher replacement rates target the need 
to support the unemployed. Combining higher replacement rates with a program 
rewarding job acceptance would mitigate the incentive problem. In fact, the OECD 
study finds evidence that packages of complementary labor market programs can 
lower unemployment.50  
Employment protection laws provide a second example of unintended 
consequences. The laws are intended to reduce unemployment by raising the costs 
of dismissals. However, the OECD analysis finds that the strength of dismissal 
regulation is not significantly related to the unemployment rate. By reducing 
dismissals, the regulations do reduce flows of workers from employment to 
unemployment (as intended), but they also reduce flows out of unemployment into 
employment once employers realize that new hiring binds them to long-lasting 
employment commitments. As a consequence, those who lose a job or enter the 
labor force to seek work find it difficult to escape unemployment, and 
unemployment durations lengthen. Despite the fact that the length of U.S. 
unemployment spells recently reached their highest levels since the Great 
Depression, the duration of U.S. unemployment remains well below the durations 
reported in major European countries.51 In 2009, for example, the share of the 
unemployed who had been out of work for over twenty-six weeks exceeded 50% in 
France, Germany, and Italy, but was 31.5% in the United States.52 Given the skill 
depreciation and discouragement that accompany long spells of unemployment, 
this unintended outcome of regulation can have serious long-term consequences. 
Furthermore a recent review of the literature on the impact of dismissal regulations 
concludes that increased employment protection law tends to reduce the 
employment for individuals with less attachment to the labor market.53 
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Like earlier academic studies, the OECD study also finds that higher payroll 
taxes raise the target unemployment rate (NAIRU).54 Turning to the effect of labor 
market institutions, the study finds that while there is no statistically significant 
relationship between unemployment and the fraction of the workforce that is 
unionized, countries with highly centralized and coordinated collective bargaining 
arrangements—the opposite of the bargaining arrangements found in the United 
States—have lower unemployment.55 
VIII. LABOR REGULATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES 
The Obama administration took office in a country in which the dispersion of 
pay was larger than in other industrialized nations. Table 1 provides three measures 
of pay dispersion for several industrialized countries. The ratio of the wage 
received by workers at the ninetieth percentile of the wage distribution to the 
median wage (the ninety:fifty wage ratio) measures inequality in the upper half of 
the wage distribution. (In 2008, a worker at the ninetieth percentile received 2.34 
times the median wage in the United States, for example.) The ratio of the median 
wage to the wage received by workers at the tenth percentile measures inequality in 
the bottom half of the distribution. For most countries, pay is more compressed at 
the bottom of the distribution. Whether one looks at the upper or lower reaches of 
the pay distribution, however, pay dispersion in the United States exceeds that of 
other countries. The last measure in Table 1 shows that the ratio of female to male 
wages in the United States increased considerably during the last decades of the 
twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century and now stands at 
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Table 1: Measures of Wage Inequality, 2008  
 
90:50 Wage Ratio 
 
50:10 Wage Ratio 
 
Female/Male Pay Ratio 
1995 2008 Change 1995 2008 Change 1995 2008 Change 
Demark 1.69 1.74 +.05 1.46 1.57 +.12 .86 .88 +.02 
Finland 1.66 1.76 +.10 1.41 1.46 +.05 .78 .79 +.01 
Norway 1.40 1.46 +.06 1.35 1.56 +.21 n.a. .91 n.a. 
Sweden 1.59 1.66 +.07 1.39 1.37 -.02 .81 .85 +.04 
France 1.93 1.98a +.05 1.59 1.47a -.12 .90 .88a -.02 
Germany 1.79 1.72 -.07 1.56 1.93 +.37 .77 .75 -.02 
Spain 2.10 1.98 -.12 2.01 1.66 -.35 .71 .88 +.17 
U.K. 1.88 1.98 +.10 1.85 1.83 -.02 .73 .79 +.06 
Japan 1.85 1.85 0 1.63 1.63 0 .63 .69 -.06 
Canada 1.74 1.88 +.14 2.01 2.00 -.01 .74 .80 +.06 
USA 2.17 2.34 +.17 2.11 2.09 -.02 .75 .80 +.05 
Average 1.80 1.85 +.05 1.67 1.69 +.02 .77 .81b +.04 
Wages = gross earnings of full-time wage and salary workers. 
a
 2007 data. 
b
 Data from Norway not included. 
Sources: OECD (2007) p. 268; OECD (2010) p.295. 
 
Table 1 also reveals that pay dispersions in industrialized countries increased on 
average since the early 1990s. Although pay dispersion actually narrowed slightly 
in the lower half of the U.S. wage distribution, the United States experienced a 
comparatively large growth in the dispersion of pre-tax wages in the upper half of 
the wage distribution between 1995 and 2008, as did a number of other OECD 
countries. Tabulations such as Table 1 describe but do not explain wage dispersion 
and by themselves provide no basis for judgments about the “fairness” or “equity” 
of measured pay inequality.  
The level and change of these national wage distributions reflect the interplay of 
market and institutional forces—often in unknown combination. The fact that the 
lower half of most wage distributions is usually less dispersed than the upper half 
may reflect in part the influence of minimum wage laws and collective bargaining, 
for example. Likewise, laws that prohibit different labor market treatment based on 
personal characteristics (for example, race, gender, religion, national origin, age, 
etc.) may have facilitated the rise in the female relative wage (as well as the 
increasing relative wages of racial minorities in the United States).  
Yet, tax policies provide the most powerful and potentially even-handed 
approach to altering the after-tax distributions. Reversing tax policies that 
contributed to increased inequality is a more reliable approach to reducing overall 
inequality than specific regulations for at least two reasons. First, much pay 
inequality reflects skill dispersion rather than the arbitrary exercise of market 
power. For over sixty years, statistical analyses of U.S. labor markets have 
recorded the strong correlations between pay and schooling, employment 
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experience, IQ, and other factors that influence the on-the-job productivity of 
workers.56 These pay differentials not only reward individuals for the investments 
that they have made in acquiring skill, but provide incentives for others to make 
similar investments. Indeed, as workers respond to the incentives by acquiring 
more skill, skill differentials should diminish. If there are barriers that limit this 
market response to pay differentials, the first-best policy is to reduce or eliminate 
the barriers rather than tinkering with the pay structure directly. (Even the use of 
tax policies to reduce inequality must remain sensitive to these issues.) 
Nonetheless, even after controlling for the influence of skill, many analyses of 
the wage distribution continue to find pay differences associated with race, gender, 
and national origin.57 There is a clear role for regulations that defeat the behavior 
underlying such differentials, and nondiscrimination laws represent one of the 
success stories of U.S. labor market regulation over the past fifty years. 
But is labor market regulation likely to counter the growing pay dispersion of 
the past two decades? Research shows that increased demand for high-skill workers 
drove much increased pay inequality over this period. Declining union 
representation and less frequent adjustments in the federal minimum wage cannot 
explain developments in the upper half of the pay distribution. Reversing these 
trends will not counter the growing inequality there. 
Globalization also plays a small role in increasing pay dispersion.58 As we see in 
Table 1, increasing dispersion has mainly been in the upper half of the pay 
distribution—a region more accessible to tax policy than labor market regulation. 
The unintended consequences of some labor market regulations provide a 
second reason for preferring tax policy. Direct labor market regulations often divide 
workers into groups of “insiders,” who enjoy the benefits of the regulations, and 
“outsiders,” who do not—an outcome that does not reliably reduce the inequality of 
labor market outcomes.59 Such unintended consequences flow from efforts to 
escape regulatory costs, much like the adjustments that individuals and 
organizations make to avoid taxes. Regulations that raise employment costs create 
incentives to reduce employment. Payroll taxes and minimum wages effectively 
benefit covered workers over uncovered workers—who either must work in 
unofficial (unregulated) employment, incur unemployment, or leave the labor force. 
Each of these alternatives yields inferior income. Membership in these two groups 
is not randomly determined. As Nobel laureate James Heckman and his coauthor 
Carmen Pages observed in summarizing a comprehensive study of labor market 
regulation in South America, “Regulation acts unevenly across different groups in 
society. Young, uneducated, and rural workers are much less likely to enjoy 
coverage than older, skilled and urban workers.”60 More broadly, there is no 
significant statistical relationship between the strength of national labor market 
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regulations and several measures of working conditions and labor rights.61 In 
contrast, tax policies can be applied more evenly across social groups. 
CONCLUSION 
I was asked to address the question of whether additional labor market 
regulation could effectively address the needs of (all) workers at the halfway point 
in President Obama’s first term of office. The immediate need of American 
workers is clearly full employment, a decidedly macroeconomic issue. Increased 
labor market regulation provides no mechanism for achieving full employment, and 
as foreign experience demonstrates, some regulations alter the level, character, and 
distribution of unemployment in unattractive ways. Even the development of a 
more ambitious noninflationary, full-employment target is not a matter for further 
labor regulation. On the contrary, there is growing evidence that labor market 
deregulation would better serve that goal. Given evidence that some labor 
regulations can produce adverse macroeconomic consequences, the low weight 
placed on new regulatory initiatives by the Obama administration is consistent with 
the objective of reestablishing full employment. 
As the economy approaches full employment, policy objectives may shift, 
focusing more attention on the distribution of labor market outcomes in a fully 
employed economy. That focus may elevate discussions of labor market regulation, 
but the potential contribution of such regulation depends on what factors drive 
current pay dispersion. Regulations can help counter the more whimsical aspects of 
a wage distribution—differences associated with discriminatory prejudices, for 
example. But pay dispersion that reflects the distribution of employee qualifications 
should be left untouched, since pay compression risks diminishing the incentives to 
acquire better qualifications.  
Proposals for more extensive labor market regulation will encounter the 
headwinds of international experience. We have already seen that industrialized 
foreign countries have carried labor market regulations much further than the 
United States. Their experience with regulation provides evidence on regulatory 
consequences. Based on that evidence, the OECD—the main international 
organization concerned with the economic growth of advanced countries—has 
increasingly encouraged an agenda of deregulated labor markets. This stance is 
supported by substantial analysis of their member countries’ experience. The World 
Bank has increasingly provided similar advice to developing countries, based on 
studies of their experience. This advice has the virtue of recognizing that it is 
difficult to improve general labor compensation without first raising labor’s 
productivity. 
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